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Abstract
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to be-
come legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions
constraining politicians’ behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power
to make decisions about the level of the public good. We derive the following
results: i) Political competition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the elimination of political rents. ii) Agents utilize the separation of powers in
order to endogenously select institutions which restrict the power of politicians.
iii) In conjunction with political competition, these institutions implement the
Lindahl allocation in the economy as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the
political game. iv) As a consequence of the previous result, political rents are
zero in equilibrium, in the sense that the winning politician does not extract part
of the social surplus because of his power. To the best of our knowledge, this in
the only citizen-candidate model with this equilibrium property.
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1 Introduction
Voting games on public goods usually have two undesirable features: i) non-existence of
equilibrium when policy platforms are multi-dimensional, ii) inefficiently low provision
of public goods when the equilibrium exists (Jackson and Moselle, 2002). Citizen-
candidate models (Osborne-Slivinski, 1996, Besley-Coate, 1997) solve the problems of
existence and efficiency of Nash equilibria in voting games, but generate a different
concern. The elected politician is free to choose any allocation of resources he prefers
and hence, in any equilibrium of these games, the social position of an individual (citizen
or executive) matters for his payoff. Therefore, in a sense, the equilibria of these games
generate excessive “rents” for the elected politician, which can be captured by the
difference between their payoffs as citizens and as elected politicians.
The purpose of this paper is to show that this negative side-effect of the citizen-
candidate models can be solved by the use of appropriately designed institutional re-
strictions in economies with public goods and complete information (which is the nat-
ural setting for these voting games). We show how agents may reach agreement on the
type of political institutions selected and how these institutions lead to efficient social
choices with zero political rents in equilibrium.
The institutions that arise endogenously from our political game is the utilization of
the separation of powers by agents (some of them choose to become politicians, while
others choose to become legislators to set the constitution) and the constitution (a set of
restrictions on the voting behavior of citizens and politicians). Therefore, institutional
arrangements on collective decisions become a necessary prerequisite for efficiency in
this case.
More specifically, we present an economy with one private and one public good and
we use a five-stage game, where all agents start as citizens. At stage one each citizen
decides on whether to become a politician or a legislator (but not both) or to remain
as a citizen. At stage two, legislators set the constitution of the economy, which defines
restrictions on political competition, and at stage three politician propose platforms.
At stage four, agents vote and at stage five the elected politician imposes taxation
and produces the level of the public good according to his proposal and constitutional
restrictions.
We show that the pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibria of this political game
implement the Lindahl allocation of the economy, which implies that none of the agents
has sufficient power to achieve his most preferred outcome (and essentially becoming
a social dictator). Thus, political rents are zero, in the sense that, in equilibrium, the
utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he is a politician or not. To the best
of our knowledge, no paper in the voting literature so far has implemented efficient
allocations implying zero political rents as Nash equilibria. In our paper, this outcome
is due to political competition in conjunction with appropriate political institutions,
and hence we highlight the importance of these two factors in eliminating political
rents and achieving efficiency.
The following assumptions are crucial for our results: i) An agent can become
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either a politician or a legislator, but not both (Separation of Powers), ii) the rules set
by legislators apply equally for all agents, conditional on their characteristics, namely
preferences and endowments (No-discrimination Principle).
In section 3, we start with a very simple model. We show why both political
competition and political institutions are necessary conditions for the implementation of
Lindahl allocations when political parties (or politicians) are exogenous. The economy
we consider consists of 2 agents and 2 goods, one private and one public. Political
parties are selfish entities which make proposals over the allocation of resources in
order to extract as much of the social surplus as possible. Agents vote for their most
preferred proposal and the party which wins the election becomes the government and
implements its policy.
The actions of the parties and agents may be restricted by the Constitution, which
in this section of the paper is an exogenously imposed set of restrictions. The constitu-
tion determines the dimension of commitment to political proposals and the maximum
amount of taxation, which a government can levy on citizens. We consider a particular
form of the constitution, which specifies that political proposals are committing only
to the level of the public good but not taxation levels and the maximum taxation on a
citizen must be such that his marginal willingness-to-pay for the proposed level of the
public good is not violated1.
Using the above constitutional rule, we examine three different cases. The first case
assumes that the constitution limits taxation, but there is a single candidate politician.
In this case, we show that the party acts as a social dictator and reaps as much political
rents as possible, given the limitation it faces. In the second case, we allow for free
entry of political parties, but we remove the maximum taxation restriction from the
constitution. In this case, we show that, despite the presence of political competition,
parties still earn political rents. In fact, because the taxation restriction is removed,
parties face weaker restrictions than the social dictator of the previous case and they
may earn strictly higher rents than him.
In the third case, we allow for both political competition and the maximum taxation
restriction to apply in the economy. We show that under these conditions the equilibria
of the game are the Lindahl allocation of the economy and prove that political rents to
parties are zero. We, thus, establish the necessity of both types of checks and balances
over the power of government for efficiency.
In section 4 we move one step further and show how political institutions emerge
endogenously, by extending the political game to the five-stage game we described ear-
lier. More specifically, at the first stage of the game agents decide what type of political
power they want to hold from the two types available: legislative and executive power.
Given theses choices, agents are distinguished into three classes, namely legislators,
politicians and citizens. Therefore, we introduce separation of powers as a potential
1We explain this definition of the maximum-taxation constraint more thoroughly in section 3. It
essentially implies that the taxation imposed by the government on an agent can not reduce his utility
below the utility he would have received if he were on his offer curve for the specific level of the public
good implemented.
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institutional control on the power of politicians, and agents in the economy choose
whether to utilize it or not. Legislators determine the constitution of the economy,
which is the set of political institutions that restrict voting behavior and political ac-
tions. Specifically, we allow legislators to determine how committing political proposals
will be and what is the constraint on maximum taxation. The rest of the political game,
then follows the game in section 3.
We find that the extended game has multiple sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, all of
which implement the Lindahl allocation of the economy. Under any preference profile,
legislators decide that politicians will be committed to the level of the public good they
announce but not to the taxation level. Instead they set an upper bound to the level
of taxation politicians can impose, namely the maximum-taxation constraint of section
3. With these restrictions in place, and because of the free entry of candidates in the
political arena, politicians can not extract social surplus by simply being in power. In
other words, political rents are zero2.
Therefore, the contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we contribute to the
citizen-candidate models by showing how institutional restrictions and the separation
of powers can facilitate political competition in achieving zero-political rents. Second,
we show that this requires that political proposals be only partially committing (com-
mitting only to the level of the public good but not taxation). Third, we show how the
required institutions can emerge endogenously by the actions of the agents themselves.
2 Related Literature
The model closest to our own is the citizen-candidate model, pioneered by Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). In their paper, each agent (citizen) in the economy decides whether
to become a candidate politician or not and then citizens vote for electing one of the
politicians under different electoral rules. The winner of the election chooses his most
preferred policy. The authors show that the number of candidates at the second stage
depends on the cost of running the campaign and the potential benefits of winning.
They also show that the plurality rule generates more candidates than an electoral rule
based on runoffs.
Besley and Coate (1997) introduce the citizen-candidate framework into a multi-
dimensional policy setting and examine the implications of the model for the efficiency
of the final allocations. They also present an application of their model in economies
with public goods. They show that an equilibrium of the game always exists, even
though the policy space is multi-dimensional, and that the resulting allocations are
Pareto efficient.
Despite the similar structure of political competition between the above papers and
ours, there are some major differences as well. In both models (Osborne and Slivinski,
2There are also other equilibria of the game, which hold only for specific preference profiles, but
the equilibrium allocation remains the same. The only difference is in terms of the constitutional
restrictions that arise in these equilibria.
4
Besley and Coate), the (lack of) commitment to political proposals is exogenously
imposed, while in our case it emerges endogenously. In other words, the case they
consider, namely that politicians implement their most preferred policy when they are
in power, corresponds to the case in our model where legislators decide that political
proposals are not committing to any dimension. Moreover, we show that if commitment
is endogenous this case will never be chosen (that is, in our model, this case is off the
equilibrium path.). We also assume implicitly that political entry is costless, while
the assumption in these papers is that each citizen must pay some cost to become a
candidate.
As a result, the properties of the equilibrium allocations in the two types of games
differ substantially. The main difference is that in our case politicians do not implement
their most preferred policy. In fact, the equilibrium allocation does not depend on the
identity of the politician and as a result, as long as there are at least two candidates,
there are no incentives for strategic entry. A second implication of this is that, in
our model, political rents are zero in equilibrium, in the sense that, given a specific
equilibrium allocation, the utility of an agent is not dependent on whether he is a
politician or not. In other words, in equilibrium, becoming a politician does not provide
additional benefit to a citizen. Obviously, in the political game of Osborne-Slivinski or
Besley-Coate this does not apply, as the equilibrium utility level of an agent depends
critically on his social identity (citizen or politician).
There is an extensive literature on voting games with simultaneous proposals and
multi-dimensional policy space. The main finding of these papers is that, if the propos-
ing members are free to make any type of offer, then the corresponding voting games
have generally no equilibrium. The theoretical literature has tried to overcome this
problem by examining restrictions on preferences that would make them compatible
with a notion of political equilibrium. It is not in our intentions to provide a compre-
hensive list of these articles. Some of the most noteworthy contributions are related
with the work of Sen (1964, 1966) and Inada (1964), but they restrict their analysis to
triplets of preferences. Kramer (1973) provides a general characterization of necessary
conditions in order for social welfare functions to be consistent with Arrow’s assump-
tions and shows how restrictive these requirements can be. Plott (1967) provides a
different notion of political equilibrium and demonstrates how general preferences vi-
olate the conditions required to satisfy it under a simple majority rule. Subsequently,
Slutsky (1979) generalizes this result for any type of majority rules, including unanimity.
Our model is also related to the one adopted by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). They
adopt a sequential bargaining approach for the sharing of a private good, which is
essentially a generalization of the sequential bargaining game by Rubinstein (1982).
Each agent in their model has a positive probability of being a proposer and if his
allocation is objected by a majority of the agents, the bargaining process moves to the
next round. The authors show that when the time discount factor is less than one there
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium, where the first individual to propose makes an offer
which the majority accepts. It is a general feature of their model that the first proposer
has superior bargaining position compared to the rest so that some bargaining rents
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will accrue to him. On the contrary, we show that in our game political rents are zero
in equilibrium.
Nevertheless, many authors, following their seminal work, have demonstrated how
social choices can be implemented through the mechanism of a sequential bargaining
game3. Jackson and Moselle (2002) extend Baron and Ferejohn’s model to the case
where the economy contains public goods (alternatively, an ideological dimension).
They show that, if there is a sufficiently high cost of delay, then the offer of the first
proposing legislator will be approved and will contain a decision in both dimensions.
The offer will trade part of the potential private good distribution gains for a com-
promise in the public good dimension and under this procedure there is a wide set
of potential equilibrium proposals. The main difference between our model and Jack-
son and Moselle is that the sequential approach generates allocations where the final
quantity of the public good does not fully reflect the associated externalities and there-
fore it is under-produced. In contrast, the equilibrium outcome of our model implies
the elimination of political rents and the efficiency of proposals, irrespectively of party
identities.
More recently, Da´vila, Eeckhout and Martinelli (2006) have proposed a similar se-
quential bargaining mechanism for the distribution of a private and a public good
between two individuals. They find that as the cost of delay vanishes the equilibria
of the game converge to the Lindahl allocations and so the inefficiency generated by
sequential bargaining disappears. In our game, though, the efficiency result of the pro-
posals remains even if we were to assume strictly positive costs of delay. Also, it is not
clear whether their result holds for more than two agents, whereas our result holds for
any number of players greater or equal to three. Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome
of our game is exactly the Lindahl allocation.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature of political competition as a driving
force for eliminating political rents. Stigler (1972) was among the first to point out
the similarities that exist between political and market competition. In a similar way
that competition among producers reduces their ability to earn abnormal returns, com-
petition among candidates or political parties reduces the magnitude of opportunistic
behavior and the adoption of socially undesirable policies. Wittman (1989) pushes
the argument one step further, by presenting many features of the modern representa-
tive democracies as institutional designs of monitoring and control over the actions of
politicians. Despite the existence of informational constraints on their actions or the
bargaining power nested in their authorities, institutions, like political parties, elections
or the structure of the legislative bodies, create a variety of reputation and competi-
tion considerations that prevent politicians from extensive abuse of their positions.
Wittman’s conclusion is that we should not expect the inefficiencies of the political
system in democracies to be greater than the failures of competitive markets.
Though our analysis does not consider such a general set of institutional designs
it is in line with the political efficiency argument. The main difference is that we are
3See for example Merlo and Wilson, 1995 and Banks and Duggan, 2000
6
explicitly concerned with the issue of the provision of the public good and the role of
political competition in solving it, while the aforementioned research agenda is centered
around the elimination of political rents, whatever form they may take.
3 Description of the economic environment and the
mechanism
Consider an economy with 2 agents and 2 goods. Good 1 is a private good while good
2 is a public good. Let e1 and e2 be the endowments of the private good for agents 1
and 2 respectively. The public good is produced through a linear production function
F (z) = mz, where z stands for the aggregate quantity of the private good used as an
input and m is a scaling coefficient (technological constant).
Agent i = {1, 2} has a well defined ordering of preferences which can be represented
by a continuous, non-decreasing, strictly quasi-concave utility function ui(xi, y), where
xi represents the consumption of private good for agent i and y represents the quantity of
the public good produced. We assume that ui → 0, as xi → 0 or y → 0. Furthermore,
for every agent, the demand for the public good is strictly increasing as its relative
price decreases. This means that the offer curve of each individual is strictly increasing
(see also Figure 1), which is the case when the income effect is not strong (negative)
enough to overcome the (positive) substitution effect. Besides simplifying the analysis,
this assumption is made in order to restrict the attention to economies with a unique
Lindahl allocation4.
As a benchmark case we define the allocation outcome generated by competitive
markets. Each agent places an order for a certain quantity of the public good to firms
so as to maximize his utility given his endowment and the order of the other agent.
Firms, facing conditions of free entry, buy inputs from agents and try to maximize their
profits. Assume that k is the number of firms operating in the economy, where k is
a large number. Assume, without loss of generality, that the equilibrium allocation of
resources under free markets is unique and is given by: afm = {xfm1 , xfm2 , yfm} . The
resulting utility level for agent 1 and 2 is vfm1 = u1(x
fm
1 , y
fm) and vfm2 = u2(x
fm
2 , y
fm)
respectively: vfm = {vfm1 , vfm2 }5.
4The uniqueness of the Lindahl allocation, in turn, is required in order to ensure the existence of
equilibrium in our game, as we also note later on.
5Formally, agents maximize their utility with respect to the quantity of the public good they
privately demand (yi): max
yi
ui(e1− pyi,
∑
i yi), and firms maximize their profit: max
yf
(p− 1m )yf , where
p is the price of the public good in terms of the private. We can also formulate the problem in
game-theoretic terms by assuming that each agent has access to the production technology of the
public good and chooses how much to produce as a best-response to the choice of the other agent:
max
yi
ui(e1 − yim ,
∑
i yi). It is easy to verify that the two formulations give the same final allocations.
See also Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) for the definition and the characterization of the Nash
equilibrium of the above game. They also establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium under very weak
assumptions.
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Because of the nature of good 2, afm is not Pareto efficient. There exists a feasible
re-allocation of resources that can make at least one of the agents better-off without
making the other worse-off. This can be achieved through a centralized decision making
process, which takes into account the consumption externalities. However, at the same
time, we allow each agent to veto any centralization process, in which case we assume
that it is effectively blocked and agents resort to competitive markets for allocating
resources. Therefore, under the assumption of veto power, vfm is an effective outside
option, which determines the individual participation constraints on any centralized
allocation scheme. Even though the ability to veto centralized processes does not change
our results (political rents are defined in terms of the competitive equilibrium utility
levels instead of the no-private consumption outcome that would be produced under
absolute dictatorship), we include it for checking the robustness of our results to the
existence of participation constraints or not.
First, we highlight the importance of political competition for the efficient provision
of the public good. In order to make the source of political rents as transparent as possi-
ble, we initially take the institutional constraints and political parties as exogenous (we
will relax these assumptions in the subsequent section). Consider the following central-
ized decision making mechanism manifested into a voting game dictated by the rules
of a Constitution. The players of the mechanism are political parties (or alternatively
politicians) and the 2 agents. A political party is an exogenous entity which makes
offers of prospective quantities of the public good to agents and tries to be elected as
government. Parties exhibit risk neutrality and their utility is the probability to win the
election in the voting game times the rents they receive from their offers: V p = pwinr
p 6.
Agents play the double role of being the consumers of the final allocations produced in
the economy and voters, who decide which party will become the government.
The Constitution is a exogenous political institution which puts restrictions on the
action set of parties and voters. More specifically, it specifies the types of political
proposals that parties can make, the way agents vote and how a government is elected
to implement its proposed allocation. Agents vote for the party whose proposal provides
the greatest level of utility for them (sincere voters). If agents are indifferent between
two proposals, then we assume that they vote arbitrarily for one of them, say the
proposal of the party with the lowest index7. The party which receives the majority of
votes, wins the election. Ties are again solved arbitrarily, say for the party with the
lowest index8.
Party proposals consist of only one element: the quantity of the public good to be
produced (yp). Let PRp = {yp} denote the political proposal of party p. If a party
is elected into power, then it will be called to implement the level of the public good
it proposed before the election. Note, however, that, while the party has committed
itself to the quantity of the public good, it has not committed itself to the taxation
6None of the results we produce is affected by the degree of risk aversion of political parties.
7Even though the assumption of sincere-voting is quite restrictive, it is without loss of generality.
We will come back to this point and explain it in more detail in the analysis that follows.
8Of course, any other assumption about who wins the election under a tie would work equally well.
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levels that will be imposed on agents. The only constraint, which we assume that is
imposed on the government by the Constitution, is that the taxation each individual
will pay can not exceed the taxation that the same agent would have paid for the
proposed level of the public good if he were on his offer curve. This is equivalent to
saying that, given a specific proportion of aggregate taxation that an agent pays, the
maximum taxation possible is one that gives the agent the same utility level as the one
he would have obtained when the proposed level of the public good was an optimal
choice for the agent. For example, the maximum taxation possible for agent i for the
proposed level y in Figure 1 (page 12) is equal to ti. For the rest of this paper, we will
call this institutional restriction as the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint or the
maximum-taxation constraint.
However, on its own, this restriction is not sufficient to eliminate political rents,
as we show for the case of a single party. A party that faces only this constraint can
find levels of the public good for which the aggregate willingness-to-pay exceeds the
required expenditure. That is, the presence of political competition is also necessary
for the elimination of rents. On the other hand, if there are more than one parties, but
the Constitution does not impose the maximum willingness-to-pay constraint, then po-
litical parties can still earn political rents, despite the presence of political competition.
Therefore, some form of institutional restrictions are also necessary for the efficient
provision of public goods.
In order to show that political competition and institutional constraints are both
necessary requirements for the efficient provision of the public good in this economy,
we present the equilibrium of the game under 3 different conditions: i) when the Con-
stitution restricts party proposals and imposes the maximum-taxation constraint, but
there is only one party in the economy, ii) when there are two parties in the economy,
but the maximum-taxation constraint is not in place (the only constraint that applies
is the standard participation constraint) and finally iii) when both conditions (multiple
parties and the maximum-taxation constraint) are satisfied.
Case I
Consider, first, the case when there is only one party, which has secured the control of
the government and acts as a dictator. This provides a base of comparison for political
competition. The party’s objective is to maximize its rents given the constitutional
constraint on policies, and hence it tries to find the level of the public good, for which
the summation of agents net valuation is the highest. More formally, the party’s max-
imization problem can be described as:
max
y
rp(y) =
∑
i
ti(y)− y
m
subject to
ti(y) =
ysmi (y)
m
9
smi (y) =
{
si|
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
=
si
m
}
,∀i ∈ {1, 2}
The party’s problem is straightforward. It needs to choose a level of the public good
such that both agents would like to contribute a share of their endowment as big as
possible, so that political rents are maximized. The rents come from the fact that,
at the proposed level of the public good, aggregate taxation will be higher than the
required resources for its production, so that the difference is received by the party.
Below we show that these rents are positive9.
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions made above on agents’ preferences, the maxi-
mization problem of the party has at least one solution with strictly positive rents.
Proof: The party’s maximization problem can be rewritten as:
max
y
rp(y) =
(∑
i
(
ysmi (y)
m
)
− y
m
)
⇔
max
y
rp(y) =
y
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)
The First Order Condition for this problem is given by:
∂rp(y)
∂y
= 0⇔ ∂
∂y
[
y
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)]
= 0⇔
1
m
(∑
i
smi (y)− 1
)
+
y
m
(∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
)
= 0⇔
∑
i
smi (y) = 1− y
∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
(1)
9Note that the formulation above does not include agents’ participation constraints. It is easy
to show that the main result of Proposition 1 (namely that political rents are positive) holds when
participation constraints are included. The main intuition is that the allocation generated by compet-
itive markets is inefficient and, therefore, the political party can still find an allocation that generates
strictly positive political rents, even when some participation constraints are binding. The results are
available by the authors upon request.
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The left-hand side of equation (1) is the marginal benefit to the party by an increase
in the level of the public good, while the right-hand side reflects the marginal cost.
Also, notice that smi (y) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of y. Because of
the assumptions of non-satiation and strict quasi-concavity of the utility functions, for
every level of expenditure sharing si there exists a unique level of the public good y,
such that agent i maximizes his utility. Furthermore, by assumption, as si decreases
the demand for the public good strictly increases. In other words, the offer curves
for both agents are strictly decreasing functions of si (as it is shown also in Figure
1). Essentially, smi (y) is the inverse function of the offer curve and hence it is also a
decreasing function of y:
∂smi (y)
∂y
< 0.
First, notice that as y → 0, the left-hand side of equation (1) goes to 2, as both
individuals are willing to shoulder the full burden of taxation for low levels of the
public good. At the same time, the right-hand side of equation (1) is equal to 1
(∂smi (y)/∂y = 0 for very small values of y), which means that the difference of the
left-hand side minus the right-hand side is positive10. On the other hand, as y → ∞,
the left-hand side tends to 0, as individuals are willing to provide an infinitesimally
small part of their endowment for very high levels of the public good. At the same
time, because ∂smi (y)/∂y < 0⇒ −y
∑
i
∂smi (y)/∂y > 0 for large values of y, and hence
the right-hand side is greater than 1. This means that, as y →∞, the difference of the
left-hand side minus the right-hand side is negative. Since both sides are continuous
functions of y, there exists at least one level of the public good y∗ such that the two
sides are equal.
Second, because
∂smi (y)
∂y
< 0, −y∗∑
i
∂smi (y)
∂y
|y=y∗ > 0, so that at any solution of the
party’s problem it holds that:
∑
i
smi (y
∗) > 1. This means that the shares of expenditure
that agents are willing to provide for the public good exceed the required expenditure
and therefore political rents are strictly positive.
The intuition for this result is simple. When only one party is allowed to operate in
the economy it knows that it has full bargaining power over the population since its
offers will go unchallenged, so long as both agents are willing to forgo a part of their
endowment for the proposed level of the public good. It therefore becomes a social
dictator, using its power to provide allocations that maximize its rents. Because the
marginal utility of the public good is higher than the marginal rate of transformation for
both agents when its quantity is very low, proposals associated with positive political
rents are easy to find. Of course, all such proposals are socially inefficient, since they
10Recall our earlier assumption that individuals have access to competitive firms, which can produce
the public good instead of the government. As a result, the maximum proposed share of public
expenditure (smi (y)) will not exceed one. If it did, the agent would be better off by producing the good
on her own, by ordering it by a firm. In other words the maximum value of smi (y) is 1 and for very
small values of y, ∂smi (y)/∂y = 0.
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Figure 1: Offer curve for individual i
imply excessive supply of resources into the production process and consequently waste
(because politicians are exogenous entities, political rents are deadweight loss for the
society.).
Case II
The main elements of the game are the same as in the first case. However, we assume
that there are two parties in the economy and the maximum-taxation constraint does
not hold11. This means that parties are free to choose any taxation level after being
elected in government, as long as the participation constraints are satisfied. In order
to be more explicit, we present the structure of the game below:
Stage 1: Each party makes an offer on the level of the public good and it is committed
to it.
Stage 2: Each agent decides which party to vote and the election takes place. The
party which receives the majority of votes wins the election. In case of draw,
party 1 is arbitrarily chosen to implement its proposal.
Stage 3: The elected party takes over power and implements its proposal.
11It is straightforward to generalize for cases with more than two parties as the same reasoning
applies. Essentially, the only requirement for political competition is free entry of parties in the
political contest.
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The removal of the maximum-taxation constraint has an important implication for
the equilibrium outcome. Because the party in power is not constrained over the level of
taxation, political competition is rendered powerless. No matter what promises parties
make at the first stage for the level of the public good, the government will impose such
a high level of taxation on each agent, so that he is indifferent between the market and
the governmental allocation of resources. This happens because there is no effective
commitment to taxation levels after the election has taken place.
Agents, anticipating this, understand that all proposals imply the same utility level
for them, irrespectively of their promise over the quantity of the public good. Therefore,
they are indifferent between voting for one party or the other and vote arbitrarily for
one (we restrict our attention to pure-strategies). Political parties, of course, anticipate
this as they realize that their commitment to the level of the public good does not affect
agents’ voting behavior at the subsequent stage. Since the probability of winning the
election (which is either zero or one, depending on the pure-strategies of agents when
they are indifferent about party proposals) is independent of its proposal for any party,
the best choice for them is to commit to the level of the public good that maximizes
their rents after the election and simultaneously satisfies the participation constraints
of agents. In this case, parties are acting effectively as social dictators. Proposition 2
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium outcome of the 2-agent, 2-party game, without the
maximum-taxation constraint enforced by the Constitution, implies strictly positive
political rents for the party that is elected in government.
Proof: At stage 3, whichever party is elected will impose the maximum taxation
possible. Given that there is no commitment to the level of taxation at stage one by a
party’s proposal and that there is no constitutional restriction, the maximum taxation
is the one that makes each individual indifferent between the allocation he would obtain
by competitive markets and the one implemented by the government.
At stage 2, agents are indifferent between party proposals, as all of them imply
the same utility level for each individual. Therefore, their vote can not affect the final
outcome of the game and they vote arbitrarily for one party. At stage 1, parties realize
that their political offer has no impact on the voting behavior of agents. Their best
response is to set the level of the public good so as to maximize their political rents.
Formally, each party solves the following problem:
max
y
rp(y) =
∑
i
ti(y)− y
m
subject to
ti(y) = {ti| ui(ei − ti, y) = vfmi )} , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
From the First Order Condition we get that:
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∑
i
∂ti(y)
∂y
=
1
m
(2)
This is a simple cost-benefit equation. It states that the party should offer a level
of the public good such that for the last unit of it, the marginal benefit of the extra
taxation is equal to the marginal cost of the extra resources required for its production.
Let ŷ denote this level of the public good. Notice that ŷ is unique. This is due
to the strict quasi-concavity of agents’ utility functions, which implies that ∂ti(y)
∂y
>
0 and ∂
2ti(y)
(∂y)2
< 0. This means that the first partial derivative of ti(y) is a strictly
decreasing continuous function and hence the left-hand side of equation (2) is also a
strictly decreasing continuous function. Hence, the level of the public good that satisfies
(2) is unique. Also, from the total derivative of the participation constraint notice that:
dti
dy
=
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
⇒
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
y=ŷ
=
1
m
This implies that the summation of the ratio of marginal utilities is greater than
the marginal rate of transformation for all y < ŷ:
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
y<ŷ
>
1
m
⇒
ŷ∫
0
∑
i
(
∂ui
∂y
∂ui
∂xi
)
dy >
ŷ∫
0
1
m
dy ⇒
∑
i
ŷ∫
0
(
dti
dy
)
dy >
ŷ
m
⇒
∑
i
ti − ŷ
m
> 0
The last inequality above states that political rents are strictly positive for the
party that proposes ŷ. Now, since agents vote arbitrarily at stage two (because they
are indifferent on which party to vote), it might be the case that they always vote for
one of the two parties, say party one. The other party anticipates this and may propose
any level of the public good (since it expects to lose the election). But the winning
party is not indifferent, as it maximizes its rents by proposing ŷ. If, on the other
hand, both parties receive a strictly positive probability of winning the election (say
one agent votes for party one and the other for two), then both parties will propose ŷ in
equilibrium. In other words, the game has multiple sub-game perfect equilibria in terms
of strategies, but the equilibrium level of public good is unique and it implies strictly
positive political rents for the elected party. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
This shows that political competition on its own is not a sufficient condition for the
elimination of political rents. Institutional restrictions are also necessary, a point that
we will emphasize in the next case. In fact, without the maximum-taxation constraint,
political parties can implement perfect price discrimination at the third stage of the
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game, so that the political rents for the ruling party will be at least as large as the ones
of the social dictator in case I, under any combination of individual preferences and
endowments. This is because political competition is powerless if there are no restric-
tions on the maximum level of taxation and as a result parties face one less constraint
than the sole party of the previous case. Once the maximum-taxation constraint is
reinstated, however, political competition leads to efficiency, as shown below.
Case III
The primitives of the economy and the political game remain the same as in the previous
case, with the difference that the two parties in the economy face the maximum-taxation
constraint. An immediate consequence of competition is that parties can not secure
election victory by simply satisfying agents’ willingness-to-pay, as was the case with a
single party. In fact political rents will be zero in equilibrium, irrespectively of the offer
that will pass.
Proposition 3: The political game as described above, with 2 agents, 2 parties and the
Constitution as described in the previous section, has a unique sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium. Both parties propose the level of the public good that corresponds to the
Lindahl allocation of the economy. Both agents are indifferent and vote arbitrarily for
one. At the third stage, the party which receives most votes becomes the government,
otherwise party 1 is selected to implement the common proposal.
Proof: Note that, because both individuals have strictly increasing offer curves, they
intersect at most once. This means that there is a unique Lindahl allocation in the
economy. Let yL, sL1 , s
L
2 be the quantity of the public good and the respective expen-
diture shares associated with the Lindahl allocation of this economy. By definition,
sL1 + s
L
2 = 1.
At the last stage of the game, the party that wins the election maximizes its rents
given the commitment it has undertaken at stage 1 regarding the level of the public
good. The implication of this is that agents will be asked to contribute their maximum
willingness-to-pay at stage 3. If a party has offered yL, then it can not extract any
political rents after election, since the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents is
exactly the same as the expenditure required for the public good. To see that, recall
from the previous section that smi (y) (the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i) is
a decreasing function of y and that the Lindahl allocation is defined as a sharing of
the public good expenditure such that both agents agree on the demanded quantity.
This means that sm1 (y
L) + sm2 (y
L) = 1, while for y < yL : sm1 (y) + s
m
2 (y) > 1 and for
y > yL : sm1 (y) + s
m
2 (y) < 1.
If a party ever offered yp > yL, then agents would anticipate that such a level of the
public good can not be implemented without violating their maximum willingness-to-
pay and hence they would not vote for the corresponding party. On the other hand, if
party p offers yp < yL, then agents, as we noted in the previous paragraph, anticipate
15
strictly positive political rents for the party. Furthermore, both agents would be strictly
better-off by an offer with a greater level of the public good. This is because levels of
y closer to the Lindahl allocation correspond to points on the offer curves with higher
utility (See also Figure 1).
Therefore, if party p offers yp = yL, then the other party will lose the election with
certainty if it makes any other offer. If party p offers yp < yL, then the other party can
win the election with certainty by offering a quantity of the public good slightly greater.
Finally, any offer yp > yL is not credible, and party q can win with certainty by making
any offer with yq ≤ yL12. As a result, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium involves
both parties proposing y = yL. The rest of the proposition follows immediately.
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Figure 2: Voting equilibrium under political monopoly and competition
The main intuition of the proposition is that, when competition is allowed, then
parties can not maximize their political rents without taking into account the offers of
their contestants. Since agents anticipate that parties can commit to the level of the
public good, but not to the tax level, they will vote the proposal which minimizes rents.
Note that the Lindahl allocation is the only credible allocation on the Pareto frontier.
Political contesters understand this and make efficient offers. The resulting equilibrium
of the game is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2. The level of the public good
ym corresponds to the choice that a monopolistic party would do. Such a level implies
strictly positive political rents for the government, as the summation of the maximum
willingness-to-pay of the two individuals exceeds one. On the other hand, yL is the
level of the public good that is obtained under conditions of political competition and
12Given the enforcement of the maximum-taxation constraint, any level of the public good, that is
greater than the Lindahl, means that the summation of private taxation, that can be levied on the
citizens, is less than the resources required to produce it. Hence any party that makes such a proposal,
if it is voted on power, will have to either accept the infeasibility of the proposal and implement a lower
level of public good (in this sense the proposed allocation is not credible) or to pay out the difference
by its own wealth (negative rents, in which case the proposal is clearly not a best-response for the
party). Therefore, there can be no equilibrium of the game where the implemented level of the public
good exceeds yL.
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it corresponds to the level of the public good under the Lindahl allocation L.
We can also see now why the assumption of sincere voting is not crucial for the
result. In the case where political proposals commit parties only to the level of the
public good, agents’ expected utility is an increasing function of the proposed public
good levels. Therefore, all agents would like to vote for the party which offers the
highest level of the public good. Even though coordination failures may arise (indeed,
without the sincere voting assumption, one can find equilibria where all agents vote
for a party with a dominated platform), one can easily dismiss them. For instance,
instead of simultaneous voting, consider the modified game where agents vote publicly
and sequentially. This eliminates any type of coordination failure and allows all agents
to vote only for the party that offers the highest utility to all of them13.
Proposition 3 seems to hold because of the way the maximum-taxation constraint
is constructed. In the following section we extend the political game and allow agents
to create the Constitution and to make proposals for the allocation of resources in the
economy. We thus allow the required conditions for the efficient provision of the public
good to arise endogenously.
4 Separation of Powers and Endogenous Political
Institutions
In the previous section we showed the importance of both political competition and
institutional restrictions for the efficient provision of the public good in the economy.
Most elements of the political game, however, were exogenously imposed and it would
seem as if our results are derived by assuming the partial commitment of parties to
their proposal and the maximum-taxation constraint.
In this section we will show how these elements of the institutional environment
can arise endogenously. Most importantly, we show that separation of powers is an
important institution for imposing checks and balances on a government.
Consider an economy with n agents, where n ≥ 3. As in the previous section, there
is one private and one public good. Each agent has an endowment ei of the private
good and a utility function ui(xi, y), which satisfies the same assumptions as before.
Let the production function of the public good be also the same as before: F (z) = mz.
Once again, let vfm be the vector of utilities that the agents of the economy receive,
if the public good is provided by a decentralized mechanism (competitive markets).
Of course, such an allocation is suboptimal. Finally, note that our assumptions on
preferences mean that the economy has a unique Lindahl allocation.
Consider the following political game. At stage 1, agents decide what type of politi-
cal power to hold. There are two types of power-holders: i) legislators and ii) politicians.
13Of course one may point out that sequential, public voting almost never occurs in contemporary
democracies. However, explaining this fact would require an environment with multiple public goods
and would add additional complications to our model, which would derail us from our initial purpose.
We leave these and some other considerations for future work.
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Legislators decide the institutional arrangements (the Constitution) of the economy.
Politicians, participate in the election by making proposals over the level of the public
good to be produced. Once in government they implement their policy. Agents decide
whether they want to become legislators or politicians or neither. However, an agent
can not become both. If no agent becomes a legislator, then no Constitution is set
and the politician elected in government has unlimited power (i.e. non-commitment of
political proposals and non-existence of the taxation constraint is the status quo). On
the other hand, if no agent becomes a politician, then no centralized decision is made
and competitive markets decide the level of the public good to be produced (i.e. the
allocation afm is the status-quo).
At stage 2, legislators decide on the form of the Constitution. Specifically, they
decide on two different institutions of political competition: i) which elements of a po-
litical proposal are committing if the respective politician rises to power, and ii) whether
the government will face the maximum-taxation constraint (as defined in the previous
section) or not. In other words, legislators choose the institutional constraints for po-
litical parties and the government. Each legislator simultaneously makes a proposal on
these two issues and according to a given choice rule, one of the proposals is chosen to
be the Constitution of this economy.
The choice rule used for deciding the Constitution is inconsequential for the final
outcome of the political game, as we will show later. For reasons of expositional clarity,
we assume that the legislative proposal which is made by the majority of legislators
becomes the Constitution. We also assume that the Constitution is binding for politi-
cians. If any of its clauses is violated by the government or other agents, then the
centralized decision making process breaks down and agents allocate resources through
competitive markets (afm).
In terms of the decisions, which the legislators make on the Constitution, the fol-
lowing assumptions are made. First, legislators choose whether political offers are
committing to the level of the public good only, to the level of taxation only, to both
or to neither. Second, legislators can choose whether to impose the maximum-taxation
constraint or not. But, the maximum-taxation constraint is anonymous. It holds for
either all agents in the economy or none. In other words, if an upper bound on taxation
is set, it can not be the case that some agents in the economy enjoy this privilege while
others are heavily taxed by the government. We call this condition the Anonymity of
the Taxation Constraint.
If there is no restriction on the maximum level of taxation and no commitment to
taxation during the election, then the government faces only one form of constraint: the
participation constraint of agents in the economy, which, as we explained in the previous
section, implies a lower bound to the utility level agents can receive by the centralized
allocation, equal to vfm. Effectively, we allow any agent to block the formation of any
centralized decision making mechanism, which gives him lower utility than the one he
receives under competitive markets.
The rest of the stages are similar to the ones in the previous section. At stage 3,
those, who have become politicians, make proposals over the quantity of the public
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good and the level of taxation. At stage 4, each individual in the economy votes for one
proposal and the proposal that receives most votes wins14. At stage 5, the politician
who made the successful proposal, receives the power to levy taxation and implement
the allocation of resources, given the restrictions of the Constitution.
Notice that some sub-games of the game above may not have an equilibrium in pure
strategies. For example, if legislators choose that political proposals are committing
to both the public good and individual taxation, then, irrespectively of whether the
maximum-taxation constraint holds or not, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
For all these sub-games, we avoid issues of non-existence of equilibrium by adopting
a sequential bargaining approach. Specifically, we assume that there are T stages of
bargaining, T ∈ N . At every stage, each political receives an equal probability of
being chosen to make a proposal. If the proposal wins the majority of votes then the
politician wins the election. Otherwise, the procedure moves to the next stage. If the
final proposal is not passed then the agents return to the status-quo allocation (afm).
Finally, we assume that all agents have the same discount factor δ.
We solve the game and derive its results by backward induction. Since there are four
different types of commitment to political proposals and two different options on the
maximum-taxation constraint, it is convenient to conduct the analysis in terms of the
sub-games which result from the eight different Constitutions that legislators can set.
Below, we analyze each in turn, by focusing on the sub-game equilibrium payoff of non-
politicians, since this is crucial for the decisions of legislators at stage two. Also note
that in all the cases analyzed below we suppose that at stage one at least two agents
have decided to become politicians and one agent is a legislator (we will examine later
the rest of possible cases).
Sub-game 1: No commitment to political proposals, no taxation constraint
Suppose that at stage two of the game legislators have chosen to impose no constraints
on politicians. This means that political proposals are not committing to any dimension
and that there is no maximum-taxation constraint. Recall that, by the assumptions we
have made about the structure of the game, this is equivalent to the sub-game where
no citizen decides to become a legislator. It is also equivalent to the structure of the
games in the citizen-candidate literature.
At stage five, the elected politician chooses the policy that maximizes his utility
given the participation constraints of agents. As we have seen in the previous sub-
section, this generally implies positive political rents, in the sense that the elected
politician receives higher utility than the level of utility he receives either under the
Lindahl allocation or the competitive markets allocation. Formally, politician p solves
the following problem:
14One can show that the type of election rule does not affect the main results. We will discuss this
in more detail later.
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max
y,t
up
(∑
i
ti − y
m
, y
)
subject to ui(ei − ti, y) ≥ vfmi for i 6= p
Apart from the politician, all the other agents lie on their participation constraint.
Otherwise, the politician would tax away all their private endowment and they would
consume only the public good (recall that ui → 0, as xi → 0). Hence, ui = vfmi ,∀i 6= p.
Given this, at stage four, all non-politicians are indifferent on whom to vote, since
their utility levels are not affected by the politician in power, and they vote arbitrarily
for some agent (as in section 3, we consider only pure strategies). At stage three,
politicians also anticipate voters’ actions and they are also indifferent on which political
platform to propose, as they do not affect the election result. Hence, they arbitrarily
propose some policy. However, the main point is that all non-politicians expect to
receive ui = v
fm
i from this sub-game.
Sub-game 2: Commitment to the level of the public good, no commitment
to taxation, no taxation constraint
At stage five the elected politician is committed to the level of the public good he pro-
posed at stage three. However, we obtain the same result as in sub-game 1. This is due
to the non-commitment to taxation and the lack of the maximum-taxation constraint,
which allows the politician to tax each agent’s private endowment until his participa-
tion constraint becomes binding. Hence, non-politicians are indifferent at stage four on
whom to vote and politicians’ best-response at stage three is to propose the level of
the public good that maximizes their utility given the non-commitment to taxation at
stage five.
Sub-game 3: Commitment to taxation, no commitment to the level of the
public good, no taxation constraint
Since political proposals are committing to individual taxation and not to the pub-
lic good, politicians’ preferences matter for voting behavior. This is because, given
the same taxation proposals from politicians, voters prefer the politician who has the
strongest preferences for the public good and hence will produce more of it. However,
this sub-game may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies and we analyze it in terms
of the sequential voting procedure described earlier. For instance, if all politicians have
the same preferences, then any proposal by one politician can be countered by a pro-
posal which slightly decreases taxation on all voters and increases proposed taxation
slightly for the politician who made the original offer.
In terms of the sequential voting procedure, at the last stage of political offers, stage
T , the politician who makes the offer faces no competition and hence he will propose
the allocation that maximizes his utility given the participation constraint of all other
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agents. Let Pmax = {tmaxP , ymaxP }, be this proposal. As before, it is easy to check that
all participation constraints are binding under Pmax. Also, let vmaxp be the utility level
that the elected politician p receives under Pmax. Let also E be the total number of
votes required for passing a proposal: n+1
2
≤ E ≤ n. As a result, the expected utility
of a politician p at the beginning of stage T is equal to: ET (up) =
1
K
vmaxp − K−1K vfmp ,
where K is the total number of politicians. Note also that the expected utility of a
non-politician i at the beginning of stage T is vfmi .
At the bargaining stage T − 1, the chosen politician q can win the approval of non-
politicians by offering Q = tQ, y such that ui(tQ,i, y
max
Q ) = δv
fm
i . If the number of non-
politicians is greater than the election threshold, n−K ≥ E, then politician q secures
election by proposal Q. Otherwise proposal Q must be such that ui(tQ,i, y
max
Q ) = δv
fm
i
for the n−K non-politicians and up(tQ,p, ymaxQ ) = δET (up) for E − (n−K) politicians.
If such a proposal Q is not feasible then politician q can not receive adequate support
for any of his offers and the game moves to stage T .
The same reasoning applies to any bargaining stage t ≤ T . This means that in
any sub-game perfect equilibrium of the sub-game with commitment to taxation and
no maximum-taxation constraint, the maximum equilibrium payoff of non-politicians,
δtvfmi for ∀i ∈ N − P , is strictly less vLi . Again, the main result of the analysis is that
the expected utility of non-politicians is strictly less than the utility they receive under
the Lindahl allocation.
Sub-game 4: Commitment to taxation and to the level of the public good,
no taxation constraint
Due to the commitment of political proposals to both dimensions, the sub-game has
no equilibrium in pure strategies and it is analyzed in terms of the sequential voting.
The analysis is identical to the one in sub-game three. At each stage of the bargaining
procedure the randomly chosen politician tries to win the minimum amount of votes re-
quire in order to secure the election. This, however, implies that non-politicians receive
the discounted value of their participation constraints.
Sub-game 5: No commitment to political proposals, taxation constraint
Political proposals are not committing and hence they are not credible. At the last
stage of the game, the politician maximizes his utility subject to the participation and
the maximum-taxation constraints. This means that if the politician chooses to pro-
duce the level of the public good y, he will impose the maximum taxation possible to
each agent for that level of the public good and place agents on their respective offer
curves (as long as their participation constraints are not violated). Also, recall that,
due to the assumptions on preferences, the utility level of an agent along his offer curve
is strictly increasing and that participation constraints are not binding if the Lindahl
allocation is provided.
Politician p can not produce any level of the public good above the Lindahl alloca-
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tion, because this either violates the maximum-taxation constraint for some agent or it
is not feasible. If the politician chooses the Lindahl level of the public good it will also
impose taxation consistent with the Lindahl allocation, so that agent i receives the final
utility that corresponds to the Lindahl equilibrium vLi . This is because the summation
of the maximum willingness-to-pay of all agents is exactly equal to the inputs needed
to produce the the public good at the Lindahl allocation and, hence, any other taxation
scheme violates the maximum-taxation constraint for at least one agent.
If the politician in power reduces the level of the public good below the Lindahl, then
his utility may increase because the maximum willingness-to-pay of the agents relaxes
and he can extract political rents for private consumption, but it also may decrease
because the level of the public good is reduced. Adopting the same notation as before,
tmi (y) =
ysmi (y)
m
is the maximum taxation which can be imposed on agent i for the level
of the public good y, where smi (y) is the maximum willingness-to-pay of agent i. Given
that the budget constraint of the politician is given by xp + y/m ≤ ep +
∑
i 6=p
tmi (y), the
overall effect in his utility by a small reduction of the public good below the Lindahl
level is given by:
−dup
dy
|y=yL = −∂up∂xp
[
− smp (yL)
m
+ yL
m
∑
i 6=p
∂smi (y)
∂y
|y=yL
]
− ∂up
∂y
In the sum above, the first term is positive (both terms inside the brackets are nega-
tive) and reflects the marginal increase in utility due to the increase in the consumption
of the private good, while the second term is negative and reflects the marginal decrease
in utility due to the decrease of the public good. If the first term is greater than the
second in absolute values, then the politician prefers to decrease the level of the public
good below the Lindahl. In this case, agents final utility decreases as they move along
their offer curves to lower levels of the public good. If the second term is greater than
the first, then the politician imposes the Lindahl allocation of the economy.
At stage 4 agents anticipate this behavior by the elected politician. Therefore, they
vote for the politician who will choose the highest level of the public good at stage 5,
and this voting behavior is independent of any political proposal. As a consequence,
any combination of political proposals at stage 3 is an equilibrium of this sub-game
and agents, except for the preferred politician, receive at most the utility levels of the
Lindahl allocation (vL).
Sub-game 6: Commitment to the level of the public good, no commitment
to taxation, taxation constraint
This is effectively Case III of section 3. Since political proposals are committing to
the level of the public good only and the maximum-taxation constraint holds, politi-
cians compete on who will offer the highest level of the public good. As a consequence,
in the equilibrium of this sub-game, non-politicians will end up receiving vLi .
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Sub-game 7: Commitment to taxation, no commitment to the level of the
public good, taxation constraint
Since this is one of the sub-games that may have no equilibrium in pure strategies, the
analysis follows closely the one for sub-game 3. The only difference is that politicians
can not tax agents more than their maximum willingness-to-pay due to the maximum-
taxation constraint. Let Pmw = {tmwp , ymwp } be the policy that maximizes the utility
of politician p under the maximum taxation and individual participation constraints.
As we we showed for the case where there is no commitment to any dimension of po-
litical proposals but the maximum-taxation constraint is imposed (see also sub-game
5), ymw ≤ yL and therefore for any agent i other than the politician it holds that
ui(t
mw
i , y
mw) ≤ ui(tLi , yL).
Therefore, at the last stage of proposals, stage T , if politician p is chosen, he makes
the offer Pmw = {tmwp , ymw} and agents vote for it. Then, by backward induction and
by using the same reasoning as in sub-game three, at every stage t ≤ T the chosen
politician makes a proposal which gives to the rest of the agents the maximum between
their continuation value of the game and their participation constraint. In all possible
cases, the maximum utility level for non-politicians does not exceed viL.
Sub-game 8: Commitment to taxation and the level of the public good, tax-
ation constraint
The analysis of sub-game 7 also implies in this case.
Stage 2:
It is clear that the critical stage is stage 2, at which legislators decide the Consti-
tution, given that they know the identity of all politicians. Using the analysis that
preceded, we conclude that it is a weakly dominant strategy for legislators to set the
constitutional rules of sub-game 6. This is because these rules ensure that the Lindahl
allocation will be implemented by political competition irrespectively of the identity of
the politicians15.
To see this, recall that in sub-games 1 to 4, legislator l expects to receive utility
equal to vfml , in other words, his participation constraint is binding. In sub-game 5, the
legislator’s expected utility is dependent on the preferences of the elected politician and
his utility is at most vLl , only if the politicians’ most preferred level of the public good
(given constitutional restrictions) is yL (which, in turn, requires specific restrictions
on the politicians’ preferences). In sub-games 7 and 8, the legislators expected utility
15It remains to be shown that political competition will indeed be part of the equilibrium path at
stage one.
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depends on the identity of all politicians, since they all have a chance of being elected
at stage one of bargaining, and his expected utility is at most vLl , only if all politicians’
most preferred allocation is the Lindahl.
In contrast, in the equilibrium of sub-game 6, l expects to receive vLl , irrespectively
of the preferences of politicians. Notice also that it is a weakly dominant strategy
for every legislator to set the constitutional rules of sub-game 6, irrespectively of his
preferences. Therefore, in any sub-game perfect equilibrium of sub-stage two in which
there is at least one legislator and two politicians, the Lindahl allocation will be the
equilibrium outcome. If, furthermore, none of the politicians’ preferences satisfy the
condition we described at sub-stage 5 (i.e. the restrictions on preferences that make
the Lindhal allocation the most preferred one by a politician), then the unique optimal
action for all legislators is to make political proposals committing to the level of the
public good only and to impose the maximum-taxation constraint.
Notice also that these equilibria are independent of the election rule for either the
Constitution (the way legislators decide on the political constraints) or the politician
(the way voters decide on who will be the elected politician).
Stage 1: Political Entry
Finally, at stage one, we analyze the entry of citizens on political competition and
the legislation authority. Clearly, it is a best-response for at least one agent to become
a politician. Since afm is generally below the Pareto frontier, if one agent becomes a
politician then, under any constitution, he can strictly improve his utility by proposing
his most preferred allocation given constitutional restrictions.
We consider different constitutional cases in order to examine whether a second agent
prefers to become a politician. Assume that there is at least one citizen who decides
to become a legislator at stage one. If agent p decides to become a politician and
his preferences satisfy the condition of sub-game 5, then legislators will be indifferent
between setting the rules of sub-game 5 or 6 at stage two. Given that, any citizen at
stage one will be indifferent between becoming a politician or a legislator and remaining
as a citizen, as the final outcome will be the Lindahl allocation, irrespectively of how
many other agents become politicians.
If, however, p does not satisfy the condition of sub-game 5 (which is generally
the case) then there are two cases to consider. If there is no legislator, then there is
no commitment to political proposals, any non-politician i expects to receive vLi and
therefore he is indifferent on whom to vote. If another agent p′ decides to become a
politician, then he may win the election if he is favored by the arbitrary strategies of
voters when they are indifferent on whom to vote or by the election rule in case of a
tie. If such p′ exists then it is a best-response for him to become a politician and hence
it can not be an equilibrium of the game p to be the only politician.
If there is no other agent p′ who is favored over p, then all other agents are indiffer-
ent on whether to enter political competition or not. However, this may still not be an
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equilibrium of the game. If p preferences are such that, under the maximum-taxation
constraint, his most preferred policy implies strictly greater utility than vLl for some
agent l, then this agent’s best-response is to become a legislator instead of remaining
a citizen in order to impose the maximum-taxation constraint at stage two. In other
words, there is an equilibrium of the game such that agent p becomes the only politi-
cian and all the other agents remain citizens, but it requires restrictions on the set of
preferences for p and specific pure-strategies for voting when voters are indifferent on
whom to vote (for example, always vote for agent 1 whenever his proposal is equivalent
to any other politicians’).
First, notice that the above equilibrium of the game is equivalent to the equilibria
generated by the citizen-candidate models. However, unlike these models, the positive-
political-rents equilibrium holds only for specific preference profiles and only if we con-
sider specific voting strategies for tie breaking. Hence it is not a general equilibrium of
our game. Notice also that, whenever the conditions for this equilibrium are fulfilled
there are also other equilibria of the game with zero political rents (which we derive
shortly). Finally, this equilibrium is not robust if there is an infinitesimally small but
positive probability that agents would vote for another candidate (since that agent’s
best-response would be to enter the political contest in order to reap the infinitesimally
small expected political-rents).
On the other hand, if there is at least one legislator, then, by becoming a politician,
another agent p′ ensures that it is the best response for the legislator to choose the
constitutional restrictions of sub-game 6 and hence ensures a minimum payoff of vLp′ .
In other words, apart from some special cases described above, it is not an equilibrium
of the game for only one agent to become a politician. Therefore, the set of politicians
is greater or equal to two.
Stage 1: Entry of Legislators
We now come to examine if any citizen decides to become a legislator. First, suppose
that there are no legislators, a number of citizens greater or equal to one and at least
two politicians. Then this is clearly not an equilibrium outcome, since at least one of
the agents can improve his utility by becoming a legislator, imposing the constitutional
restrictions of sub-game 6 and receiving a final payoff of vLi > v
fm
i . This means that
the only potential equilibrium with no legislators, apart from a special case examined
above, is the one where all agents decide to become politicians.
We have also examined the case where there is no legislator and only one politician
and under which conditions it may turn out be an equilibrium of the game. The
remaining alternatives to consider are the following cases: i)all agents become politicians
and ii) there is at least one politician and at least one legislator.
Suppose that all N agents decide to become politicians. If voting is sincere, then
each agent votes for his own proposal and agent 1 is elected (recall that in the case of
ties, the politician with the lowest index is elected). This can not be an equilibrium
of the game, as at least one other politician can increase his utility by becoming a
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legislator instead and ensuring a payoff of vLi for himself. If voting is not sincere, then
under any pure strategy profile, a specific politician will be chosen (for example, all
politicians vote for p). This can not be an equilibrium either by the same argument
as above. Hence, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium of the game with all agents
deciding to become politicians16.
Consider the case where there is at least one legislator and only one politician. This
is an equilibrium of the game only if p’s preferences satisfy the condition of sub-game 5.
If this condition is satisfied then legislators set the maximum-taxation constraint and
this is sufficient for ensuring that the final policy implements the Lindahl allocation
(as we showed in sub-game 5). The rest of the agents of the economy are indifferent
whether they become politicians or not and hence there is no profitable deviation. Once
again, this is a special type of equilibrium that holds for specific preference profiles.
However, the following class of equilibria holds for all possible preference profiles17.
Suppose that at least two agents decide at stage one to become politicians and at least
one to become legislator. Then the best-response of legislators at stage two is to impose
the maximum-taxation constraint and make political proposals committing to the level
of the public good only (this is a best-response for legislators for all preference profiles,
unlike the previous case examined above). As a consequence and due to the analysis in
sub-game 6, all agents receive the level of utility corresponding to the Lindahl allocation.
This is a sub-game prefect equilibrium of the game, because no one can unilaterally
deviate and become better off. If the number of politicians is greater than two and the
number of legislators in greater than one, a unilateral deviation by any agent does not
affect equilibrium institutions or political proposals. If, on the other hand, there are
only two politicians, none of them wants to exit political competition as in the best of
cases his final utility will remain unchanged and in the worst it will strictly decrease.
Likewise, if there is only one legislator there is no other strategy for him that can strictly
increase his utility and therefore it is a best-response for him to remain a legislator.
However, apart from at most three agents, the rest of the citizens are indifferent on
what social role to choose and hence any distribution of agents between politicians,
legislators and citizens, which is consistent with the above results, is an equilibrium of
the game.
Proposition 4, below, summarizes the analysis so far for the class of equilibria which
are independent of the preference profile of the economy.
Proposition 4: The game of section 4 has multiple sub-game perfect pure-strategy
equilibria. However, the following class of equilibria is the only class of equilibria that
holds for all possible preference profiles of the game: At least two agents decide to be-
come politicians, at least one becomes a legislator, political proposals are committing
to the level of the public good only and the maximum-taxation constraint holds. The
16Things get a little more complicated under mixed-strategy equilibria, but we can show that if the
number of agents is sufficiently large, then there is at least one agent who prefers to become a legislator
17Because the conditions for the other “special-case” equilibria are mutually exclusive, there are
preference profiles for which the general class of equilibria is the only class of equilibria of the game
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equilibrium allocation is the Lindahl allocation.
First, the following assumptions are crucial for our results: i) the Anonymity of the
Taxation Constraint, and ii) the restriction that an agent can hold only one power.
Other assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the equilibria of the game. For in-
stance, the choice rule through which legislators decide the Constitution plays no role,
since in equilibrium, all legislators agree on the desirable set of restrictions. We use it
only for the facilitation of the analysis.
Second, in our game, almost all political institutions required for the implementation
of an efficient allocation of resources, arise endogenously. Legislators decide what type
of restrictions to set to voters and politicians. Proposals are also made endogenously
by politicians. The anonymity condition and the separation of powers are the only
institutions which are not created by agents. However, as far as separation of powers
is concerned, it should be noted that agents have the choice between utilizing this
institution or not. Since both types of power are used in equilibrium, it makes sense to
say that separation of powers emerges endogenously.
5 Conclusion
Centralized decision making is very helpful for the solution of the free riding problem,
but, without any set of restrictions on the authority that implements it, inefficiencies,
in the form of political rents, arise. This paper shows why political competition is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for political efficiency. Other forms of institutional
restrictions, like restrictions to maximum taxation, are required for aligning political in-
centives with societal interests, so that voting games achieve equilibria, which otherwise
they would not have. It is also worth noting that we focus our analysis on public goods,
because private goods do not exhibit externalities and therefore, if centralized decisions
fail to provide efficient outcomes, this is not crucial for societal welfare. Competitive
markets could be used, instead, to allocate resources. In other words, the reason why we
examine the role of political institutions is exactly because they impact the efficiency of
social decisions when they are needed the most: to solve problems which involve public
goods.
We take our analysis one step further, by asking whether and how the required
political institutions can emerge endogenously. The answer we give to this question is
to the affirmative. In the extended political game of section 4, we show how separation
of power can arise endogenously and how legislators select appropriate institutions in
order to limit the extractive powers of politicians. Thus, the point we make is that
whenever collective decisions may increase societal welfare, agents have an incentive
to devise and agree upon appropriate political institutions so that the decision process
does not break down. In fact, because the equilibrium outcomes of our game coincide
with the Lindahl allocations of the economy, we can say that agents have the incentive
to devise appropriate institutions so that they limit the rents of politicians.
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There is a variety of dimensions which our game can be extended to, while retaining
its power, and most of these dimensions were discussed in the preceding sections. Our
next step is to generalize the game for economies with multiple public goods and find if
additional political institutions are necessary for achieving the same set of equilibria. We
also intend to examine how these institutions can emerge by the actions of the agents.
Another question of interest is whether our results can be extended to economies with
asymmetric information. In this case, what are the political incentives for selecting a
specific mechanism and through which institutions do agents align political interests
with their own? We leave these questions for future research.
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